oeuvres di leibniz gottfried, Prima edizione (5 risultati)

FIRST EDITION THUS. Large 4to.(26 x 19.5 cm). pp.xvi+[2, Table & Errata]+540+[16,Table des Principales Matières]. Contemporary full mottled calf, sides ruled in blind, spine with raised bands and gilt-decorated with floral motifs, red morocco label lettered in gilt, marbled endpapers and edges. Title-page printed in red and black. Engraved vignette to title-page by O. de Vries, decorative woodcut head-pieces, culs-de-lampe and initials throughout. Lightly rubbed, a few tiny wormholes to foot of spine, occasional browning and light spotting, generally an excellent copy in a handsome contemporary binding. First edition thus, being the first collected edition of Leibnitz' philosophical works in French and Latin, and containing the FIRST PRINTING of one of Leibnitz' most important philosophical works, his "Nouveaux essays sur l'entendement humain", a riposte to John Locke's "Essay on Human Understanding" which Leibniz had read in Pierre Coste's celebrated French translation of 1704. "The New Essays.are a detailed commentary on Locke's Essay and thus represent an almost unique case in which one major philosopher produces a paragraph-by-paragraph critique of the principal work of another. Leibniz had practically completed the manuscript by 1704, but after learning that Locke had died he apparently lost interest in publishing it. He put it aside, and it did not appear in print until 1765, nearly fifty years after his death" (Benson Mates). Written directly in French, this extensive treatise (pp.1-496) comprises most of this collection and also constitutes one of the largest and most important of Leibniz's philosophical contributions, being, (in addition to the Theodicy), one of only two full-length works which Leibniz ever produced. Like many philosophical works of the time, it is written in dialogue form. The two speakers in the book are Theophilus ("lover of God"), who represents the views of Leibniz, and Philalethes ("lover of truth"), who represents those of Locke. The famous rebuttal to the empiricist thesis about the provenance of ideas appears at the beginning of Book II: "Nothing is in the mind without being first in the senses, except for the mind itself". All of Locke's major arguments against innate ideas are criticized at length by Leibniz, who defends an extreme view of innate cognition, according to which all thoughts and actions of the soul are innate. In addition to his discussion of innate ideas, Leibniz offers penetrating criticisms of Locke's views on personal identity, free will, mind-body dualism, language, necessary truth, and Locke's attempted proof of the existence of God. (The Encyclopedia of Philosophy IV, p. 431).

Condizione: MOLTO BUONO. Avec une preface de Mr. Kaestner. cm.21,5x26, pp. [iv], xvi, [2], 540, [18]; frontespizio figurato con vignetta incisa, titoli in rosso e nero. Esemplare internamente in ottimo stato e completo. NOTA:PRIMA EDIZIONE. Legatura con dorso quasi totalmente staccato. / Amsterdam, Chez Jean Schreuder cm.21,5x26, pp. [iv], xvi, [2], 540, [18]; frontespizio figurato con vignetta incisa, titoli in rosso e nero. rilegatura settecentesca in mezza pergamena, la legatura ha il dorso quasi totalmente staccato. Esemplare internamente in ottimo stato e completo. rilegatura settecentesca in mezza pergamena, la legatura ha il dorso quasi totalmente staccato.

ÒLeibniz was moved by the publication in 1704 of CosteÕs French translation of LockeÕs Essay on Human Understanding to lay his thoughts in detail alongside those of Locke. LeibnizÕ New Essays (Nouveaux Essais sur lÕentendement humain) was not a systematic criticism of LockeÕs philosophy. It contains occasional discussions of LockeÕs views, but in general Leibniz expounded his own views, without giving reasons, on the points raised by Locke. The book is thus more valuable as a collection of passages relating to aspects of LeibnizÕ system than a thoroughgoing criticism of Locke. Leibniz had intended to publish the New Essays and get LockeÕs views on them, but Locke died in 1704, the year in which Leibniz wrote them, and he gave up the idea. They were first published at Amsterdam and Leipzig in 1765Ó (The Encyclopedia of Philosophy IV, p. 431). ÒLeibnizÕ Nouveaux essais sur lÕentendement humain, completed in 1705 but not published during his lifetime, presented a detailed criticism of LockeÕs position. By adding nisi ipse intellectus to the famous maxim, Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu (wrongly attributed to Aristotle by Duns Scotus, Leibniz neatly reversed the application of the principle by Locke. According to Leibniz, the mind originally contains the principles of the various ideas which the senses on occasion call forthÓ (D.S.B. VIII, p. 151). Quarto. [4], xvi, [4], 540, [16] pp. Title printed in red and black with engraved vignette by O. de Fries. Decorative woodcut head- and tail-pieces and initials. Contemporary quarter sheep over sprinkled boards with vellum tips. Spine ruled in gilt in compartments with two olive morocco gilt labels. Edges stained red. Occasional light foxing, marginal dampstain to final two leaves, short tear in the upper margin of the final leaf. Small circular ownership stamp on title. A superb copy. First collected edition of LeibnizÕs works and first edition of his ÒNouveaux essais sur lÕentendement humainÓ (pp. [1]-496). The editor, Raspe, was at this time secretary at the University Library of Gttingen and was the author of The Adventures of Baron Munchhausen. Kaestner, professor of mathematics contributes a short but valuable introduction highlighting the mathematical and scientific contributions contained in these little known writings. Attig 482n. Brunet III, 950. Graesse IV, 152. Qurard V, 119. Yolton C1765-4.

Amsterdam et Leipzig, Chez Jean Schreuder, 1765. 4to. Uncut in the original marbled boards. Professionally rebacked preserving almost all of the original back. The fragile orginal binding is here preserved in its entirety, and it has quite a bit of overall wear. Apart from a small hole to two leaves in the index, affecting ab. one work on each of the four pages, it is internally nice and clean. Title-page printed in red and black. Beautiful eng. title-vignette and a few other woodcut vignettes and initials. (4), XVI, (2), 540, (18) pp. First edition thus, being the first collected edition of Leibnitz' philosophical works in French and Latin, and containing the FIRST PRINTING of one of Leibnitz' most important philosophical works, his "Nouveaux essays sur l'entendement humain" (New Essays on Human Understanding), in which he attacks and refutes Locke and his "Essay on Human Understanding" and gives important testimony to his own philosophical ideas. With its 496 pages, this extensive work takes up most of this collection of philosophical works, and it also constitutes one of his largest and most important of his philosophical works. As explained by Raspe, the editor, in his preface to this publication, "LES NOUVEAUX ESSAIS SUR L'ENTENDEMENT HUMAIN, qui sont la partie principale de recueil, sont connûs trés imparfaitement par l'histoire de la Philosophie de Leibnitz, que Mr. Ludovici a publiée" (p. X), and the reason why the work was known, even though it had not been published, is because of a letter that Leibnitz had written in 1714, in which he explains why he did not wish to publish the work. Raspe quotes the letter (p. X), from which it becomes clear that Leibnitz had not wished to publish an attack on Locke and his work, because Locke had died in 1704 (the same year that Leibnitz had actually written the work), and because Leibnitz was against publishing refutations of dead authors: "Mais je me suis degouté de publier des refutations des Auteurs morts, quoiqu'elles dissent paroitre Durant leur vie & étre communiqués à eux memes". Raspe points to the nobleness of this decision, but he also points to what could be other reasons for Leibnitz not wishing to publish his seminal work, one of them being that towards the end of his life (he died in 1716), he did not wish to enter into any more controversies with the British, since he was already engaged in two very important ones that occuopied much of his time and energy: The first concerned the invention of the differential calculus, the second was against Mr. Clarke on liberty and important metaphysical and theological questions. Another reason could also be that he did not want to begin controversies with the friends of Locke, who at that time were many and important.Locke's "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding", which is the work here being refuted by Leibnitz, became the crucial groundwork for the future empiricists with David Hume in the foreground, and thus Leibnitz' work, though published posthumously, probably came to play a bigger role in the history of philosophy than it would have done had it been published just after he wrote it. Few philosophers of his time were susceptible to Leibnitz' ideas and his application of logic to the problems of metaphysics, as most of them were far more receptive to Locke's empiricism. However, when Leibnitz' "Nouveaux essays." was finally published here in his "Oeuvres philosophiques" in 1765, it became hugely influential and was also an important factor in the development of Kant's transcendental philosophy.The hugely famous work by Locke, in which he stated his famous theory that the mind of the newborn is like a blank slate (tabula rasa) and concluded that all ideas come from experience and that there are no such things as innate principles, was generally sharply criticized by the rationalists, the most important of them being Leibnitz. Leibnitz' response, his "Les nouveaux essays sur l'entendement humain" constitutes the most im.

Amsterdam et Leipzig, Jean Schreuder, 1765 [Hanovre, Jérôme Michel Pockwitz, 1764]. In-4 (243 x 201 mm), demi-veau fauve de l'époque à petits coins, dos à 5 nerfs surlignés de filets gras dorés, pièce de titre de veau blond, tranches mouchetées, (4), xvi, (2), 540 p., (16) p. d'index et colophon, (1) f. d'errata, titre rouge et noir, grande vignette de titre emblématique gravée par O. de Fries. Première édition collective des oeuvres de Leibniz. Elle a été publiée d'après les manuscrits originaux par l'érudit allemand Rudolf Erich Raspe et préfacée par Abraham Gotthelf Kaestner, mathématicien, professeur à l'université de Göttingen. Elle contient l'édition originale de 'Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain' qui occupe la majeure partie du volume (pages 1 à 496), avec la 'Théodicée' l'un des deux seuls essais majeurs que Leibniz parvint à compléter. Composée en 1703 mais publiée seulement en 1765, cette oeuvre constitue une réfutation méthodique de 'l'Essai sur l'entendement humain' de John Locke. Présentée sous la forme d'un dialogue imaginaire, elle met en scène deux personnages : Philalète, défenseur de la position empiriste inspirée par Locke, et Théophile, partisan de l'approche rationaliste, qui s'appuie sur les arguments développés par Leibniz. Commentant son Essai, Leibniz déclara: "j'ai fort médité moi-même sur ce qui regarde les fondements de nos connaissances (). De toutes les recherches il n'y a point de plus importante, puisque c'est la clef de toutes les autres". Contient: "Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain - Examen du sentiment du P. Malebranche que nous voyons tout en Dieu contre J. Locke - Dialogus de connexione inter res et verba, et veritatis realitate -- Difficultates quaedam logicae - Discours touchant la méthode de la certitude et de l'art d'inventer pour finir les disputes () - Historia et commendatio linguae charactericae universalis ()". (Müller, 'Leibniz-Bibliographie', 2155. River, 472. Stojan, 56. Yolton, 'John Locke, a Reference Guide', C.1765-4). Bel exemplaire, très frais, grand de marges, très bien relié à l'époque.